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THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THIS ACTION.
This Court in its MEMORANDUM DECISION at page 2, stated the following:
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Walsh challenges the trial court's award of prejudgment interest. A trial court's
award of prejudgment interest presents a question of law that we review for
correctness. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App.
1993). Prejudgment interest is appropriately awarded if the damages can be fixed at a
particular time and calculated with mathematical certainty. Shoreline Development,
Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App 1992). This is clearly a case in
which damages are calculable with mathematical precision and prejudgment interest is
properly awarded. Erickson's damages merely reimburse her for the tendered purchase
price of Walsh's unsalable interest in the partnership for which she received nothing.
Robinson and Van Alstyne's damages represent Walsh's liability for one half of the
partnership debts. Walsh's liability in this regard is easily calculated by subtracting
the proceeds from the sale of business assets from the existing debts, and dividing the
amount in half. The information necessary to make these calculations was within the
control of Walsh. We therefore affirm the trial court's award of prejudgment interest.
This Court is absolutely correct in the citations to the two cases of Andreason
vs. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) and Shoreline
Development, Inc. vs. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, (Utah App. 1992), however
Appellant respectfully submits that the analysis and holdings justify there by no
prejudgment interest, rather than the other way around. Appellant includes a copy of
each of the cases in the addendum.
In the case of Andreason. this Court stated on page 177 as follows:
In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in not awarding
them prejudgment interest on the jury's damages award. The trial court's decision on
plaintiffs' entitlement to prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we
review for correctness. Vali Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health Care
Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1990); Hermes Assocs. v. Park's Sportsman, 813
P.2d 1221y 1223 (Utah App. 1991). Consequently, "we need not accord any particular

deference to the decisions below." Vali, 797 P.2d at 444 (citing Hurley v. Board of
Review, 161 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988) (agency decision); Scharfv. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (trial court decision)).
Plaintiffs argue that by establishing the threshold facts of promise, reliance and
damage, they created an entitlement to full compensation for their expenses, including
interest on the money expended six years previously. According to plaintiffs, their
right to full compensatory damages includes prejudgment interest as matter of law
because (1) their damages were sufficiently fixed at the time that they incurred
expenses to repair their home, and (2) prejudgment interest is appropriate because "the
damages claimed were with reference to the value of the repair of damaged property."
The Utah Supreme Court first discussed the rationale behind prejudgment
interest in Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1005-06 (1907).
The Fell court stated that because awarding damages at law was intended to return a
plaintiff to the status quo, prejudgment interest could be available where necessary to
accomplish full compensation. Id. In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in
situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and
figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. Bjork v. April
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct
2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977). Although damages may be unliquidated, they must be
calculable through a mathematically certain procedure allowing the court of the jury to
fix the amount by following "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value ...
rather than be[ing] guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount" or
evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by which to measure their value. Fell, 88
P. at 1007; Price-Orem v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App.
1989). If sufficient certainty exists, courts should allow interest from the time when
damages became fixed, rather than from the date of the judgment. Bjork, 560 P.2d at
317. However, "where 'damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province
of the jury to assess at the time of trial,'" then prejudgment interest is inappropriate.
Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 483 (quoting Fell, 88 P. at 1006).
Then again on page 178, this Court went on and stated:
. . . . In assessing this amount, the fact finder is guided by its best judgment, not
a known standard of value. . . .
Furthermore, in contrast to a tort action for property damage, the recovery
properly awarded under a promissory estoppel theory reflects the extent of reliance. To
separate the damage for which defendant must accept responsibility from expenses
which would have occurred in the absence of defendant's promise requires the
determination of a fact-finder. Factual evaluation of this type lacks mathematical
certainty prior to final determination and requires case by case analysis. When "the
amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the

trial," prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 482 (quoting
#orA, 560 P.2d at 317).
Then in Shoreline, this Court stated on page 211 as follows:
The determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether the
damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be calculated with
mathematical certainty. See, e.g., JackB. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107,
108-09 (Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract was ascertainable by calculation).
"A court can award prejudgment interest only when the loss is fixed at a particular
time and the amount can be fixed with accuracy." Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790
P„2d 1222, 1225 (Utah App.1990). If the jury must determine the loss by using its best
judgment as to valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest
is inappropriate, Id. See Bjorkv. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) cert
denied, 431 U.S. 930. 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (where damages cannot
be calculated with mathematical accuracy, the amount of the damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact and prejudgment interest is not allowed);
Felly. UnionPac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006 (1907) ("In all. . . cases
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to
assess at the time of the trial, no interest is permissible.")
The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated that the lack of mathematical
certainty generally prevents an award of prejudgment interest in equity claim.
A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that
interest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property, in actions
brought on a written contract and in an action to recover a liquidated over-payment of
water subscription charges. In many of these cases, we stressed that the loss had been
fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with
mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of damages. No case
has been cited to us where we have allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as
the instant suit of this nature. , . invokes consideration of the principles of equity
which address themselves to the conscience and discretion of the trial court." In view
of the highly equitable nature of this action where the court has discretion in
determining the amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no error in the
denial of prejudgment interest.
Appellant submits that had this been a case where the amounts had been
ascertainable early on then prejudgment interest may well have been recoverable,
however, there is absolutely no basis in the evidence to suggest that the amounts

claimed by the Counter claimants (Appellees) were ever ascertainable, even through
the end of trial.
The first reason why this is so, is because the trier of fact had to determine
appropriate setoffs to be applied to the claims made by the Appellees in this action.
On page 46 of the Transcript, during the first day of testimony, Peter Van
Alstyne testified as follows: (Note page 46 in Addendum)
Q.

And did you in fact distribute to her (Jude) some of the unsold assets of
the partnership?

A.

Right.

Again on pages 121 and 122, Peter Van Alstyne testified that he distributed
personal property to Jude Erickson, to Gerald Robinson and to himself: (Note pages
121 and 122 in the Addendum)
Q.

Okay. Then when youfinallysold it the following June of '86, you said
that you didn't sell all the assets, that some of the assets you kept and
some you gave to Erickson.

A.

These are assets that Video U.S.A. did not want to buy. They could not
use them.

Q.

What were they?

A.

Well, there was a T.V. and then some Beta movies that were damaged,
and a video camera that was broken. And I think a cash register and
some office supplies. Those, I gave to Jude. We purchased two video
recorders.

Q.
A.

Who is "we"?
My wife and I. So, we made out a check and purchased the two video
recorder. I took the T.V., because the video store had purchased out of
my own pocket and I paid a carpet cleaning bill earlier that spring. And I

reimbursed myself for that with some other supplies.
Q.

Let's move on to the proceeds from this contract of sale on June, '86,
with Video U.S.A.

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q.

Who received those proceeds?

A.

Well, Gerald and I.

Q.

The reason I'm asking is, I heard Mr. Crawley ask you, and Robinson
had gotten all of the proceeds from that; is that true?

A.

Well, Fm sorry, no. I've taken Gerald and I've split them. I used my
proceeds to pay my legal costs since Mark initiated this action against
me.

As noted in the Memorandum Decision, at page 2, this Court stated:
Walsh's liability in this regard is easily calculated by subtracting the proceeds
from the sale of business assets from the existing debts, and dividing the
amount in half. The information necessary to make these calculations was
within the control of Walsh.
Appellant respectfully submits that this is absolutely not so for two reasons:
(1)

As noted above the lower Court first had to determine the setoffs of the

personal property taken by each of the remaining principals, after the sale of the assets,
and
(2)

The Appellees themselves did not ever ascertain the amounts they

claimed to be due and owing, until they literally were preparing for trial in this matter.
As to the first argument, it is unchallenged that the principals took substantial
assets when the business was sold. As noted above, they each took items of personal

property, and in the case of Peter Van Alstyne and Gerald Robinson, they each took
cash in addition.
These individuals surely can not take these items, and then double dip against
Mr. Walsh, and claim that he must pay the remaining balance after the sale of the
business.
Even if these many items were of little value considered separately, still the
lower Court had to determine the appropriate setoff that Appellant would be entitled
to, in the aggregate, before the remaining amount that would be due and owing would
be mathematically calculable.
These setoffs for the many items of personal property taken of used
merchandize, etc. were clearly not something that Appellant could have determined in
advance of the trial itself, and hence the analysis of Andreason, is particularly
appropriate.
Furthermore, in contrast to a tort action for property damage, the recovery
properly awarded under a promissory estoppel theory reflects the extent of reliance. To
separate the damage for which defendant must accept responsibility from expenses
which would have occurred in the absence of defendant's promise requires the
determination of a fact-finder. Factual evaluation of this type lacks mathematical
certainty prior to final determination and requires case by case analysis. When "the
amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the
trial," prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 482 (quoting
#orJfc560P.2dat317).
In Andreason this Court determined that even though certain items of personal
property, and cabinets, appliances, etc. could be ascertained, the whole amount was
still very much in question, because the lower Court had to decide what values would

be allowed and which ones would not.
This is particularly so in the case before this Court, as one can not determine
what the setoffs were going to be for unidentified personal property which were
admittedly received by each of the principals.
Hence, the case law clearly stands for the notion that when the amount can be
mathematically determined then prejudgment interest is appropriate but where it is not,
then prejudgment interest is not appropriate.
In this case, it was clearly the later, and hence no prejudgment interest would be
allowed as a matter of law.
As to the second point, that the Appellees themselves did not ever ascertain the
amounts they claimed to be due and owing until they literally were preparing for trial,
is born out on page 312 of the transcript for April 25, 1989, which is included in the
addendum.
Appellees had submitted inconsistent testimony on what the principal amount
was due, and then Peter Van Alstyne states to his own attorney:
Q.

Which one is right, this one or the one Mary Ann prepared?

A.
I prepared this just as a general ballpark when I was consulting with you
as to what at the very least would be the outstanding debt that I am in the hole, out
these dollar amounts. At the very least. I didn't really work into any consideration
with respect to interest accruing there. I was just trying to get a general idea.
It is not only clear that the Appellees themselves did not ascertain what amounts
they were claiming prior to trial, even the Judge after all of the evidence was in, asked

for clarification from the Appellees as to what amounts they claimed were due and
owing. As noted on page 313 of the Transcript for April 25, 1989, Judge Moffat made
the following comment after the trial was over, and he was taking the matter under
advisement. (Note the same in the addendum)
THE JUDGE:
I would like a road map. I think it's as I said in chambers,
it's fairly clear as to the position of the plaintiff in relation to the relief sought. Fm not
now that clear in relation to the dollar and cents on the claim for relief under the
counterclaim, because the evidence has altered it somewhat from the claims as set
forth in the pleadings but as to the plaintiffs claim that there is a change or alteration
in those figures, I would like there to be all the evidence out and in the open to tell me
what our bottom line is.
Hence, Appellant respectfully submits that the amounts claimed to be owed by
the Appellees was anything but mathematically calculable.
Hence, there is absolutely no basis for prejudgment interest in this action.
Lastly, this Court makes a certain point in its MEMORANDUM DECISION,
that bears special consideration.
This Court stated, "The information necessary to make these calculations was
within the control of Walsh."
Appellant respectfully submits that, even should this Court completely disregard
all of the arguments stated above, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that this
statement of fact, can ever be born out in the record.
The record on the other hand states that this information was in fact never
disclosed or otherwise made available to Mr. Walsh. Note page 46 of the Transcript,
which is included in the addendum, wherein Mr. Van Alstyne stated:

Q.

Mr. Van Alstyne, you testified that you did not confer with Mr. Walsh
about the sale of the business beginning in the Fall of 1985, is that
correct?

A.

Yeah.

Appellant respectfully submits that there is absolutely no basis for an award of
prejudgment interest.
Appellant respectfully submits that this determination is a critical one to him, in
light of this fact that the total judgment is reduced by the sum of $12,515.22 should
this Court disallow prejudgment interest, as well as the post judgment interest on the
same.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully prays that this Court will carefully consider the law as
outlined so clearly by this Court in the two cases cited in the MEMORANDUM
DECISION, which are included in the addendum.
It can not be disputed that there was absolutely no way for the Appellant to
ascertain the amount due to the Appellees, as they themselves stated under oath that
they had not even determined the same until they were preparing for trial, and then
even during the trial they changed their position, and as noted by Judge Moffat, he
could not follow what their bottomline was, and requested assistance of Counsel to
clarify.
Lastly, even if this Court does not change its prior ruling regarding prejudgment
interest, it can not be said that this appeal is without merit, and Appellant respectfully

requests that no attorneys fees on appeal be allowed.
Hence, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse on the issue of
prejudgment interest, and remand the matter to the District Court to determine the
amounts owing in the judgment, with no award of Attorneys fees on appeal. Counsel
for the Plaintiff hereby certifies that this Petition is presented in good faith and not for
delay.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 1995

1/ M.
JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, to the Defendants, by mailing the same in
the United States Mail, addressed to JOYCE MAUGHN, 455 SOUTH 300 EAST,
THIRD FLOOR, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84111, dated this 19th day of April,
1995.
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SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation, Milton Jones, and
Milton Hanks, Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,
UTAH COUNTY and American Fork
City, Defendant, Appellant, and
Cross-Appellee.
No. 910241-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 10, 1992.
Alleged agent brought suit against
county for services rendered in obtaining
dredging pumps intended to be used by
county on lake. The Fourth District Court,
Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., entered
judgment on jury verdict in favor of agent
on unjust enrichment claim. County appealed and agent cross appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that:
(1) claim for unjust enrichment was an
equitable claim not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, and (2) agent was
not entitled to award of prejudgment interest.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>173(2)

County's claim that corporate powers
of county statute barred claim by alleged
agent for unjust enrichment as result of its
services in aiding county in obtaining
dredge, which claim was not raised at trial,
would not be considered for first time on
appeal. U.C.A.1953, 17-4-5.
2. Counties <3=»208

Claim against county by agent for unjust enrichment arising from its services in
aiding county to obtain dredge was an equitable claim not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, despite county's contention that it was acting in effort to control
flooding. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3.
3. Counties <3=>223

Jury's finding that county received
benefit of $94,000, as result of agent's ser835 P.26—7

vices in aiding county in obtaining dredge
was supported by sufficient evidence, even
though county never made use of dredge
pumps after removing them from dredge
because it was unable to find way to retrofit dredging pumps for use; county failed
to marshal evidence in support of $94,000
award, but only marshaled evidence showing efforts of agent and attempted to counter evidence with some evidence of efforts
expended by county and state, in apparent
attempt to show that agent was not sole
party involved in obtaining dredge.
4. Trial <S=>307(3)
Trial court was not required to grant
requests by jury during deliberations that
deposition of witness, who had been unavailable to testify at trial, and whose deposition had been read to jury, be sent to jury
room. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 47(m).
5. Interest <£=>39(2.20)
Agent, which obtained unjust enrichment award from county for agent's services in obtaining dredge, was not entitled to
award of prejudgment interest; jury had
discretion to award interest as part of equity judgment, so that there was risk of
double recovery.
6. Interest <s=>39(2.15)
Determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether damages
upon which interest is sought can be calculated with mathematical certainty.
7. Interest <s=»39(2.15)
If jury must determine loss by using
its best judgment as to valuation rather
than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is inappropriate.
8. Interest <s=>39(2.20)
Prejudgment interest must be sought
directly as damages in unjust enrichment
cases, if at all, and may not be subsequently added by trial court to jury's award for
unjust enrichment.
Kay Bryson and Jeril B. Wilson, Provo,
for appellant.
Gregory J. Sanders, Salt Lake City, for
appellees.
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Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
RUSSON, JJ.
AMENDED OPINION ON
REHEARING *
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Shoreline Development, Inc., brought
suit against Utah County for services rendered by Shoreline in obtaining dredging
pumps intended to be used by the County
on Utah Lake. The trial court entered a
partial directed verdict in the County's favor dismissing Shoreline's contract claims.
Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim, however, was sent to the jury. The jury found
in Shoreline's favor and awarded it $94,000
for the services rendered. The County appeals and Shoreline cross-appeals. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1985, Shoreline entered into an agreement with American Fork City l to operate
a boat harbor the City owned on Utah
Lake, which is located in Utah County. It
was determined that a dredge was necessary to develop the harbor. Shoreline began to investigate ways of obtaining a
dredge and ended up working with William
Arseneau, the Director of State Surplus
Property. They identified certain surplus
federal government dredges that could be
released for use on this project. The principals of Shoreline spent many hours working on the project in 1985. Beginning in
the early part of 1986, they were each
working on the project an estimated 50 to
60 hours per week.

dredge "Harding" which belonged to the
Army Corps of Engineers and was located
in Portland, Oregon. The dredge had two
large dredging pumps that could be salvaged for the County. The Commission
took a voice vote and authorized expenditure of $2,000 to get the project going.
Immediately after the meeting, Shoreline
prepared a letter memorializing the agreement that had been reached with the commissioners. That letter was hand carried
to the Commission the next day. When the
written memorialization of the agreement
was delivered, a check for $2,000 was given
to Shoreline. No express written contract
was executed by the parties.
Shoreline then moved forward under the
understanding it had an agreement with
the County to obtain a dredge and set up
business operations on Utah Lake. Shoreline presented the County with written reports concerning its investigation. Shoreline again met with two of the county commissioners to discuss the project in general,
and the dredge Harding in particular.
Shoreline claims that the commissioners
again took an express oral vote and specifically authorized Shoreline to proceed with
obtaining a dredge for the County. One of
the principals of Shoreline remembers a
commissioner specifically stating that no
bid process was required in order for the
agreement to be made.

In mid-March, 1986, a meeting was held
with the Utah County Commission to discuss the work being done by Shoreline for
American Fork. All three of the county
commissioners attended, as well as Clyde
Naylor, the county engineer. During the
meeting, Shoreline outlined a proposal
whereby it would obtain a dredge for the
County and be given the exclusive rights to
operate it on Utah Lake. Shoreline indicated it was focusing its efforts upon the

After this second meeting with the commissioners, Shoreline continued to work towards obtaining the dredging pumps off
the Harding for the County. In early June
of 1986, it became known that the dredging
pumps were going to make it to Utah. The
principals of Shoreline then met with the
county commissioners and other officials,
including the mayor of American Fork.
They were totally surprised in that meeting
when the commissioners thanked them for
their efforts in obtaining the dredging
pumps and then told them that there was
no deal in place. One of the commissioners
suggested that Shoreline submit a bill.

* Replaces this court's opinion of the same name
filed on May 19, 1992 (187 Utah Adv.Rep. 26).

1. American Fork has settled with Shoreline and
is not a party to this appeal.
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After Shoreline had been excused from
the deal, the government paperwork was
completed and the dredging pumps were
delivered to the County. The county's engineer signed one document acknowledging
that the value of the dredge was $6,022,563. County commissioner Gary Anderson,
in accepting the dredge, also signed a document acknowledging its value at $6,022,563.
Shoreline presented a bill for $250,000 to
the County for the value of its services in
obtaining the dredge. The County refused
to pay the bill and Shoreline brought suit.
Shoreline claimed the County was liable
under an express contractual agreement
that Shoreline would obtain a dredge for
the County. In the alternative, Shoreline
claimed that if there was no express contract, the County was liable under an implied-in-fact contract as evidenced by the
work actually performed by Shoreline. As
a final alternative, Shoreline claimed that
the County was liable for the unjust enrichment it received from Shoreline's efforts.
At the close of Shoreline's evidence, the
County moved for a directed verdict as to
the express contract and the implied-in-fact
contract claims. The County argued that it
was protected from any contractual claims
because it did not act in accordance with
state code or its own customary practices
in dealing with Shoreline and therefore it
could not be bound by those acts. The
County conceded at that time that the unjust enrichment claim could properly be
presented to the jury. The trial court
agreed and granted a directed verdict in
favor of the County on Shoreline's first two
claims. The County then rested, without
putting on any case of its own, and the
unjust enrichment claim was sent to the
jury. The jury awarded Shoreline $94,000
for services rendered. Shoreline then re2. The Governmental Immunity Act has since
been amended, but without change to the relevant language. See section 63-30-3(3) (Supp.
1991).
3. Shoreline also cross-appeals the dismissal of
its contract claims but only requests that we
address these issues if we reverse the unjust
enrichment award. Inasmuch as we affirm the

quested prejudgment interest on the $94,000, but the trial court denied the request.
The County appeals, claiming it is shielded from the unjust enrichment claim by
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-5 (1991) (corporate
powers of a county), and by Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989) (the Utah Governmental Immunity Act).2 The County also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
as to whether it received a benefit from
Shoreline's efforts. And finally, the County claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to take into the
jury room a deposition that had been read
into evidence. Shoreline cross-appeals the
denial of prejudgment interest, claiming
that interest may be awarded in an unjust
enrichment case.3
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Defenses
[1] The County asserts that Shoreline's
unjust enrichment claim is precluded by
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-5 (1991). This defense was not raised below. We will not
address issues raised for the first time on
appeal. See Zions First Nat. Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,
654 (Utah 1988).
[2] The County also asserts that Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim is barred by
the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989), because the
County was acting in an effort to control
flooding. The supreme court has clearly
held that "[governmental immunity may
not be used as a defense to equitable
claims
" Board of Educ. of Granite
School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d
1030, 1036 (Utah 1983) (quantum meruit
claim upheld where county "acquiesced in
the receipt of the benefit").4 Shoreline's
judgment, we need not address the trial court's
legal conclusions as to the first two claims.
4. See, e.g., Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake
County, 734 P.2d 910, 911-12 (Utah 1987) (quantum meruit claim was recognized as permissible, but claim failed for lack of evidence that
county was directly benefitted); Breitling Bros.
Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., 597
P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1979) (remanded for further
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unjust enrichment claim is therefore not
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[3] The County challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that
the County received a benefit in the
amount of $94,000. In particular, the
County argues that the benefit of Shoreline's services could not have been $94,000
because the County received no "net benefit" from obtaining the dredge. After the
dredging pumps were removed from the
dredge, the County never made use of
them. The County argues that it was simply unable to find a way to retrofit the
dredging pumps for use on Utah Lake. In
fact, the federal government ultimately repossessed them. The County errs, however, in focusing on the "net benefit" of
the entire transaction. The appropriate
benefit upon which Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim is based, and upon which
damages must be awarded, is the service
rendered by Shoreline in obtaining the
dredge. The fact that following the receipt
of this benefit the County was unsuccessful in making a profitable use of the
dredge is immaterial to the valuation of
Shoreline's services. The County, not
Shoreline, bore the risk the venture might
fail.
The County has failed to satisfy its burden of marshaling the evidence in support
of the jury's holding that it received a
benefit worth $94,000. Hodges v. Gibson
Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991)
(appellant must set out all evidence that
supports jury verdict, including all valid
inferences, and demonstrate "that reasonable persons would not conclude that the
evidence supports the verdict"). The County does marshal the evidence showing the
efforts of Shoreline and attempts to counter it with some evidence of the efforts
expended by the County and the State in an

apparent attempt to show that Shoreline
was not the sole party involved in obtaining
the dredge. The primary focus of the
County's marshaling, however, is on whether it received any "net benefit" from the
venture. The County has not marshaled
the evidence in support of the $94,000
award. Nowhere in the County's attempt
to marshal is there any indication that the
services rendered in obtaining the dredge
were not worth $94,000. We therefore do
not disturb the jury award. See, e.g., State
v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah
App.1990) (when appellant fails to marshal,
reviewing court presumes that the holding
is adequately supported by the clear weight
of the evidence).
DEPOSITION
[4] During its deliberations, the jury requested that the deposition of William Arseneau be sent into the jury room. Due to
the unavailability of Arseneau, his deposition had been read in its entirety to the
jury during the trial. The trial court refused to allow the deposition to be sent to
the jury room because Arseneau's written
testimony might receive more weight than
other oral testimony. The County argues
that the trial court erred in not allowing
the jury to review the deposition.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
47(m), the jury may not take depositions
with them when they deliberate.5 The
question of whether written testimony
should be allowed in the jury room has
already been addressed in State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939),
wherein the supreme court held: "The law
does not permit depositions or witnesses to
go to the jury room." 6
In light of Rule 47(m) and the supreme
court's unequivocal holding that depositions are not permitted in the jury room,
we find no error.

proceedings regarding quantum meruit claim
against the state when trial court dissuaded
plaintiff from presenting claim).

have been received as evidence in the cause,
except depositions "

5. Rule 47(m) provides, in relevant part and with
our emphasis, "[u]pon retiring for deliberation
the jury may take with them the instructions of
the court and all exhibits and all papers which

6. The supreme court reaffirmed its holding in
Solomon in State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14-15
(Utah 1984).
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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
[5] In its cross-appeal, Shoreline challenges the trial court's refusal to award
prejudgment interest on the $94,000 unjust
enrichment award. Shoreline asserts that
prejudgment interest should be available
because an unjust enrichment claim falls
somewhere between the poles of express
contract claims, where prejudgment interest is often allowed, and tort claims, where
prejudgment interest is seldom allowed. In
particular, Shoreline asserts that the similarity between an unjust enrichment claim
and a contract claim weighs in favor of
awarding prejudgment interest. Shoreline's reliance on the nature of the claim,
however, is misplaced.

A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that
interest has been allowed in actions for
damage to personal property, in actions
brought on a written contract, and in an
action to recover a liquidated overpayment of water subscription charges.
In many of these cases, we stressed that
the loss had been fixed as of a definite
time and the amount of the loss can be
calculated with mathematical accuracy in
accordance with well-established rules of
damages. No case has been cited to us
where we have allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as the instant
case, which is for equitable relief. "A
suit of this nature . . . invokes consideration of the principles of equity which
address themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court." In view of
the high)y equitable nature of this action
where the court has discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no error in
the denial of prejudgment interest.

[6, 71 The determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether the
damages upon which prejudgment interest
is sought can be calculated with mathematical certainty. See, e.g., Jack B. Parson
Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107, 108-09
(Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract
was ascertainable by calculation). "A Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097
court can award prejudgment interest only (Utah 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting
when the loss is fixed at a particular time Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah
,and the amount can be fixed with accura- 1976)).
cy." Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790
Shoreline asserts that there is a public
P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah App.1990). If the
policy ground for awarding interest in equijury must determine the loss by using its ty cases despite the uncertainty of the dambest judgment as to valuation rather than ages. While we recognize Shoreline's confixed standards of valuation, prejudgment cern that injured parties be made whole,
interest is inappropriate. Id. See Bjork v. we find that this concern is adequately
April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) addressed by reason of the fact that equity
cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 plaintiffs may claim lost interest as part of
L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (where damages cannot their damages. Uinta Pipeline Corp. v.
be calculated with mathematical accuracy, White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887
the amount of the damage must be ascer- (Utah 1976) (where justice and equity retained and assessed by the trier of fact and quire, interest may he awarded as part of
prejudgment interest is not allowed); Fell the damages). Since a jury has discretion
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. to award interest as part of an equity judg1003, 1006 (1907) ("In,all . . . cases where ment, there is a risk of double recovery if
the damages are incomplete and are pecu- prejudgment interest may be added to a
liarly within the province of the jury to jury's equity award by the trial court who
assess at the time of the trial, no interest is does not know whether the jury's award
^e^missible^').
covers interest. In order to prevent such
The Utah Supreme Court recently indi- double recovery, we presume that if the
cated that the lack of mathematical certain- claimant was entitled to any interest, it was
ty generally prevents an award of prejudg- awarded by the jury as part of the equity
award.
ment interest in equity claims.
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[8] Given the risk of double recovery,
and in light of the supreme court's ruling
in Bellon, we hold that prejudgment interest must be sought directly as damages in
unjust enrichment cases, if at all. Prejudgment interest may not be subsequently
added by a trial court to a jury's award for
unjust enrichment. We therefore find no
error in the trial court's refusal to award
Shoreline prejudgment interest on the $94,000 judgment awarded by the jury.

so we do not address it for the first time or
appeal. Furthermore, the county may noi
raise governmental immunity as a defense
against an equitable claim for unjust en
richment. As to the assertion that the tria
court erred in refusing to allow the deposi
tion in the jury room, we find no error. As
to Shoreline's cross-appeal requesting prejudgment interest, we also find no error,
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ., concur.

CONCLUSION
As to the County's appeal of the judgment for unjust enrichment, the County
failed to raise its statutory defense below
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rably harmed by the violation, the violation was innocent, defendants' cost of
removal would be disproportionate and
oppressive compared to the benefits
plaintiffs would derive from it, and plaintiffs can be compensated by damages.
Id. (citing Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Ass'n, 535 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1975)),,
[14] In this case, we find that substantial evidence relevant to this criteria supports the trial court's decision to refuse to
order the removal of the McNeils' encroachment. Plaintiffs' actions and advance notice indicate that they would not
be irreparably harmed by the encroachment. Their predecessors in interest willingly purchased Lots 12 and 13 with the
understanding that the lots extended only
to the center line of the river, and plaintiffs
made their offer to purchase with that
same understanding. On the other hand,
the McNeils are innocent possessors of the
encroaching residence who neither constructed the house nor knew of its encroachment at the time of their purchase.
While their home would be greatly damaged or totally destroyed by removal, plaintiffs' intended use and enjoyment of the
undisputed remainder of the property
would not be significantly hindered by allowing the encroachment to remain. Based
on this evidence, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the balance of equities weighed
in favor of compensating plaintiffs through
damages for the loss of the disputed piece
of land.
Plaintiffs also claim that if equity would
not require the removal of the McNeils'
home, the trial court still erred by allocating the entire disputed portion to them.
Plaintiffs claim that the court acted arbitrarily in returning the boundary line to the
center of the Santa Clara River and erroneously neglected to consider what portion of
plaintiffs' disputed real property was actually necessary to accommodate the
McNeils' encroachment. We note, however, that plaintiffs' own expert provided the
calculation of the square feet occupied by
the McNeils' encroachment and that plain-

tiffs offered no evidence regarding any
lesser portion of land for the court's consideration. It was, therefore, within the trial
court's discretion to use plaintiffs' expert's
testimony in determining what segment of
land should remain with the McNeils.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, the trial court did not
err in considering the Santa Clara River an
adequate monument for purposes of boundary by acquiescence. Because the Zanes
presented sufficient evidence to meet all
elements of that doctrine, the court did not
abuse its discretion in quieting title of the
disputed land in their favor. It also acted
within its discretion in refusing to require
the removal of the McNeils' encroachment
and then awarding plaintiffs damages to
compensate them for the land whose title
the court ordered quieted in the McNeils.
We affirm.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.
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Derek ANDREASON and Dana Andreason, Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,
v.

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant, and
Cross-Appellee.
No. 910615-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 18, 1993.
Homeowners whose property was damaged by fire brought action against insurer, seeking to recover damages based upon
promissory estoppel theory. The District
Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. Stirba,
J., following jury's award of damages, refused to subject award to remittitur or
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order new trial, but also refused to grant
prejudgment interest. On cross appeals,
the Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held
that: (1) homeowners presented sufficient
evidence to allow jury to determine their
entitlement to promissory estoppel damages and to calculate value of damages,
and denial of new trial or remittitur was
not unreasonable, but (2) even if plaintiffs'
recordation of expenses accurately reflects
value.of their personal expenditures, it
does not provide known standard of value
for measuring damages in promissory estoppel case, as required for award of prejudgment interest.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., concurred in result only.
1. Jury 0=14(1)
"Promissory estoppel" is equitable
claim for relief which is normally tried to
bench.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. New Trial <3=76(1)
Damage assessment is peculiarly jury
function and, thus, trial courts should exercise caution in setting aside verdict and
ordering new trial on basis of excessive
damages.
3. New Trial <®=>76(1)
Trial court enjoys broad discretion in
deciding whether to set aside verdict and
order new trial on basis of excessive damages, as long as its grounds for granting
remittitur or new trial fit one of seven
specified in rule. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 59.
4. New Trial <®=>74, 77(1)
Trial court should review propriety of
damages award and grant new trial only
where it is obvious that jury lacked reasonable basis for its decision, acted with prejudice or passion, or disregarded competent
evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59.
5. Estoppel <s=>85
Promissory estoppel claim should not
fail for lack of damages on sole basis that
plaintiffs received benefit.

6. Estoppel <s=*118
Homeowners presented sufficient evidence to allow jury to determine their entitlement to promissory estoppel damages
and to calculate value of damages in action
against insurer which had misrepresented
that policy covered fire damage, and denial
of new trial or remittitur was not unreasonable; there was evidence from which jury
could reasonably infer that adhering to insurer's plan of immediate professional repair required homeowners to forego their
option of gradual self-help and necessitated
additional expenses, and allocation of approximately 90% of homeowner's expenses
as extent of damages due to detrimental
reliance was not contrary to law.
7. Damages <^184
Award of damages required that plaintiff prove fact of damages by preponderance of evidence and amount of damages
by approximations and projections that rise
above mere speculation.
8. Appeal and Error <s*842(ll)
Trial court's decision on plaintiffs' entitlement to prejudgment interest presented
question of law which appellate court reviewed for correctness.
9. Interest <s=>39(2.15)
Prejudgment interest may be awarded
in situations where damage is complete,
loss can be measured by facts and figures,
and amount of loss is fixed as of particular
time.
10. Interest <S=>39(2.15)
Although prejudgment interest may be
awarded even if damages are unliquidated,
damages must be calculable through mathematically certain procedure allowing court
or jury to fix amount by following fixed
rules of evidence and known standards of
value, rather than being guided by their
best judgment in assessing amount or evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by
which to measure their value.
11. Interest <®=»39(1)
If sufficient certainty exists, courts
should allow interest from time when damages became fixed, rather than from date
of judgment.
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12. Interest <3=>39(2.20)
Even if plaintiffs' recordation of expenses accurately reflects value of their
personal expenditures, it does not provide
known standard of value for measuring
damages in promissory estoppel case, as
required for award of prejudgment interest; rather, damage assessment requires
fact finder's case by case calculation of
value of detrimental reliance on promise
and, in assessing amount of damages, fact
finder is guided by its best judgment, not
known standard of value.
Michael P. Zaccheo, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Wayne B. Watson and Thomas J. Scribner, Provo, for appellees.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and
ORME, JJ.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company appeals a jury verdict awarding
plaintiffs, Dana and Derek Andreason,
damages based upon a promissory estoppel
theory. On appeal, defendant claims that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 'o either subject the jury award to
remittitur or order a new trial. Plaintiffs
cross-appeal, claiming that the trial court
erred a^ a matter of law in refusing to
grant them prejudgment interest on the
jury award. We affirm the trial court's
decision upholding the jury award without
prejudgment interest.

BACKGROUND
Because the parties tried this case before
a jury, we recite the facts in a light favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Perdue,
813 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Utah App.1991). On
April 4, 1986, a fire extensively damaged
plaintiffs' kitchen and garage, and caused
smoke, electrical, and water damage
throughout their home. Immediately after
the fire and for the three weeks following,
defendant's agents mistakenly represented
to plaintiffs that their fire losses would be
covered by their insurance policy with de-

fendant. A week after the fire, defendant's adjuster visited plaintiffs' burned
home, instructed them on repairs, and authorized them to proceed. Plaintiffs immediately began extensive clean up and repair
work consistent with the adjuster's instructions.
After three weeks, defendant discovered
that it no longer insured plaintiffs because
their fire insurance policy had been canceled six weeks prior to the fire. When
defendant belatedly denied insurance coverage for their fire losses, plaintiffs sued.
In May 1991, plaintiffs' suit against defendant went to trial. The trial court had
previously granted defendant a partial
summary judgment, concluding that the insurance contract was canceled prior to the
fire. The trial, therefore, continued solely
on plaintiffs' promissory estoppel theory.
During the trial, plaintiff Derek Andreason
testified in detail about the extent, nature,
and timing of the home repairs. He stated
that he undertook $41,957.69 worth of
work, and that he did "all of the work" in
detrimental reliance on defendant's promise of coverage. Mr. Andreason testified
that defendant's agent provided detailed
instructions on repairs and replacements
that should be undertaken. For example,
according to Mr. Andreason, the agent told
him not to consider repairing some items,
but to simply discard them and purchase
new ones. These items included the living
room carpet, the kitchen range, kitchen
cabinets, a cedar wall, and the tile floor.
Mr. Andreason claimed that without the
promise of insurance coverage, he would
have boarded up his home, gradually done
the work himself, and repaired rather than
replaced many items. By the time defendant repudiated its promise of coverage,
however, repair work had proceeded beyond the point where plaintiffs' self-help
plan was an option. The jury awarded
plaintiffs damages of $37,500.00.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial
or remittitur and objected to plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest from the
date they originally demanded payment for
their repair costs. The trial court denied
defendant's motion and issued a judgment
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for plaintiffs without awarding prejudgment interest. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Both defendant's appeal, seeking to vacate the jury award, and plaintiffs' crossappeal, seeking to increase the award to
include prejudgment interest, present issues related to the nature of damages in
promissory estoppel. Defendant asks this
court to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant
its motion for remittitur or a new trial,
claiming that the damages awarded were
excessive or unwarranted. On cross-appeal, plaintiffs question whether the trial
court erred as a matter of law in failing to
award them prejudgment interest, arguing
that without prejudgment interest, their
damage recovery was incomplete.
Promissory Estoppel
[1] Promissory estoppel is an equitable
claim for relief which is normally tried to
the bench. See Tolboe Constr. v. Staker
Paving & Constr., 682 P.2d 843, 849 (Utah
1984). The parties in this case apparently
agreed to present their case to the jury.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorize
the jury to act as a factfinder in an equity
action. "In all actions not triable of right
by a jury the court upon motion or of its
own initiative may try any issue with an
advisory jury or, with the consent of both
parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
verdict has the same effect as if trial by
jury had been a matter of right." Utah
R.Civ.P. 39(c); see Willard M. Milne Inv.
Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1978).
Because the jury properly heard this promissory estoppel case, we need only determine if the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to grant a remittitur or a new
trial. See Crooks ton v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991).
[2-4] Because damage assessment is
peculiarly a jury function, trial courts
should exercise caution in setting aside a
verdict and ordering a new trial on the
basis of excessive damages. Batty v.
Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978).

A trial court enjoys broad discretion in this
decision, as long as its grounds for granting a remittitur or a new trial fit one of the
seven specified in Rule 59. See Crookston,
817 P.2d at 804. The pertinent three
among these grounds include:
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it
is against law.
(7) Error in law.
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5)—(7). The trial court
should review the propriety of the damages
award and grant a new trial only where it
is obvious that the jury lacked a reasonable
basis for its decision, acted with prejudice
or passion, or disregarded competent evidence. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 803-05.
On reviewing the decision of the trial
court to grant or deny a new trial, we do
not directly review the verdict, ''ignoring
any intermediate actions by the trial
court." Id. at 802. Instead we consider
that " *[w]hen the determination of the jury
has been submitted to the scrutiny and
judgment of the trial judge, his [or her]
action thereon should be regarded as giving further solidarity to the judgment.'"
Id. at 806 (quoting Elkington v. Foust, 618
P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980)). We, therefore,
will reverse "the judge's ultimate decision
to grant or deny a new trial, . . . only if
there is no reasonable basis for that decision," id. at 805, resolving any doubt in
favor of the trial court, id. at 806.
Because the insurance contract between
plaintiffs and defendant was cancelled
when defendant offered to reimburse plaintiffs for the repairs necessitated by fire
damage to their home, plaintiffs based
their claim against defendant on promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel may be
invoked in circumstances where " 'equity
recognizes the unfairness of permitting
withdrawal of the promise and will enforce
it' " Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 846 (quoting Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah
2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1964)). The
necessary elements of promissory estoppel
include: "(1) a promise reasonably expect-
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ed to induce reliance; (2) reasonable reliance inducing action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person; and
(3) detriment to the promisee or third person." Weese v. Davis County Comm'n,
834 P.2d 1, 4 n. 17 (Utah 1992) (emphasis
added). Utah has also adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90
describing promissory estoppel as follows:
" 'A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach
may be limited as justice requires.' " Tol*
boe, 682 P.2d at 845 (quoting Restatement
(Second) Contracts § 90(1) (1981)).
The factual prerequisites for promissory
estoppel are:
"that the defendants were aware of all
the material facts; that in such awareness they made the promise when they
knew that the plaintiff was acting in
reliance on it; that the latter, observing
reasonable care and prudence, acted in
reliance on the promise and got into a
position where it suffered a loss."
Id. at 845-46 (emphasis deleted) (quoting
Union Tank Car, 387 P.2d at 1003).
Defendant argues that when the facts of
plaintiffs' case are compared to the essential promissory estoppel elements, they are
insufficient to justify plaintiffs' recovery.
Although defendant concedes the presence
of a clear promise and does not challenge
the reasonableness of plaintiffs' reliance on
that promise, it claims that plaintiffs deserve no recovery because either (1) plaintiffs did not do anything as a result of the
promise that they would not have done
1. Earlier Utah cases had adopted the former
Restatement of Contracts section 90 (1932)
which reads as follows: " 'A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.'" Southeastern
Equip. Co. v. Mauss, 696 P.2d 1187, 1188 n. 1
(Utah 1985) (emphasis added). During the period of time that this first Restatement provided

without the promise, or (2) plaintiffs' expenses merit no compensation because they
provided a benefit and, accordingly, caused
no detriment to plaintiffs. Thus, according
to defendant, plaintiffs' damages were the
result of the fire, not defendant's promise,
and plaintiffs benefitted from the repairs
and replacements. For these reasons, defendant asserts that plaintiffs failed to
prove entitlement to damages. Defendant
also asserts that even if plaintiffs proved
an entitlement to damages, they provided
insufficient evidence from which to calculate damages.
Utah's appellate courts have not focused
on the claims asserted by appellant. However, Utah's adoption of the Restatement
(Second) version of section 90 does provide
useful guidance for considering these issues.1 The Restatement (Second) infused a
more flexible approach into both the substantive and remedial aspects of promissory estoppel. John D. Calamari & Joseph
M. Perillo, Contracts, § 6-1 at 273 n. 19
(3rd ed. 1987) (discussing Restatement (Second), Contracts § 90 cmt. b). This modification allows for expanded application of a
promissory estoppel theory and concomitantly allows remedies consistent with "the
extent of the reliance." Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
The trial court's Jury Instruction No. 20,
which was not challenged by either party,
accurately reflects this flexible concept of
promissory estoppel: "Damages in promissory estoppel are limited to those which are
sustained because the plaintiffs have
changed their position to their detriment in
reasonable reliance upon the defendant's
representations. They must have done
some act which they otherwise would not
have done. Only acts done in detrimental
the guidelines for promissory estoppel, Utah
courts treated the doctrine as a consideration
substitute, triggering full compensatory damages, but limited its availability to situations
where the injury to plaintiffs was so unjust and
unconscionable as to constitute near fraud, see
Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332,
333-35 (1956), or the promisor "manifested an
intention to abandon an existing right," see Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570, 575
(1953).
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reliance are compensable/' While this instruction required the jury to limit damages to those caused by detrimental reliance, it did not require that all the effects
of plaintiffs' actions be of no benefit to
them. The instruction is likewise consistent with cases allowing promissory estoppel actions to proceed where plaintiffs
nonetheless benefitted in some fashion
from acts taken in detrimental reliance on
the promise of another. For example, in
Northside Auto Serv. Inc. v. Consumers
United Ins., 25 Wash.App. 486, 607 P.2d
890, 892-93 (1980), the court affirmed a
jury verdict enforcing an insurer's promise
to pay for the insured's automobile repairs,
although the insurer later denied policy
coverage. See also Tynes v. Bankers Life
Co., 224 Mont 350, 730 P.2d 1115, 1123
(1986) (upholding a jury finding of promissory estoppel and damages where insurer
had promised to pay for critically needed
psychological treatment); Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 401 Mich. 118, 257 N.W.2d
640, 647 (1977) (remanding for trial on
claim that insurer's promise to provide coverage for plaintiffs injuries resulting from
automobile accident was enforceable).
[5] Plaintiffs argue, and we agree, that
a promissory estoppel claim should not fail
for lack of damages on the sole basis that
plaintiffs received a benefit. In the cases
noted, where plaintiffs obtained medical
treatment or repaired a car, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was applied to enforce
a promise and prevent injustice, as determined by the factfinder. While the damages must be limited to those incurred
through reasonable reliance, the flexible
and equitable nature of promissory estoppel allows for damages even where the
plaintiff receives a benefit such as improved health, a repaired car, or a repaired
home.

sory estoppel damages and to calculate
their value. An award of damages requires that a plaintiff prove the fact of
damages by a preponderance of the evidence and the amount of damages by approximations and projections that rise
above mere speculation.
See
Atkin
Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel.,
709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985).
Mr. Andreason meticulously testified
from his personal written records of expenses,2 that the repairs for which he
sought recovery were undertaken because
of defendant's representation and would
not otherwise have been done. Plaintiffs
followed the adjuster's instructions in
throwing out water damaged carpet that
they otherwise might have cleaned, discarding the kitchen stove and cabinets they
otherwise might have repaired, replacing
weakened floor joists they might have reinforced, and tearing out a burned cedar wall
and tile floor they might have cleaned and
left.3
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that adhering to defendant's
plan of immediate professional repair required plaintiffs to forego their option of
gradual self-help and necessitated additional expenses. Based on this inference, the
jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiffs' actions constituted both a change of
position and detriment. Defendant's retrospective analysis of some beneficial effect
does not prevent the jury from finding a
detriment suffered in reliance on defendant's promise and the injustice that would
occur if the promise were not enforced to
the extent of reliance.

[6,7] In our view, plaintiffs presented
to the jury sufficient evidence to allow the
jury to determine an entitlement to promis-

As the factfinder in this case, the jury
also was responsible for assigning a value
to damages that reflected the extent of
plaintiffs' detrimental reliance. Plaintiffs
actually argued that they should be reimbursed for the full cost of all the repair
work done on their fire damaged home

2. The written records were ruled inadmissible
by the trial court, upon defendant's objection.
Mr. Andreason, however, referred to and refreshed his memory from these records
throughout his testimony.

3. Defendant did not present any expert testimony of its own as to reasonable repairs or costs,
but rather elected only to challenge Mr. Andreason's calculations and credibility through crossexamination.
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during the three week period because they
would not have undertaken any of their
reparative actions without defendant's
promise of insurance coverage. The evidentiary value and credibility of this assertion were properly subjected to the jury's
assessment. "[I]n a jury trial, 'it is within
the exclusive province of the jury to judge
the credibility of the witness and the
weight of the evidence/ " State v. Larsen,
834 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App.1992) (quoting
State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah
1982)). Considering the evidence presented
to the jury, an allocation of approximately
90% of plaintiffs' expenses as representing
the extent of damages due to detrimental
reliance was not contrary to the law. The
trial court, having observed all evidence
and testimony, was not persuaded that the
jury's verdict lacked a reasonable basis,
was motivated by prejudice or passion, or
that the jury had disregarded competent
evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not
unreasonably deny defendant's motion for
a new trial or remittitur.
Prejudgment Interest
[8] In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in not awarding them prejudgment interest on the
jury's damages award. The trial courts
~
decision on plaintiffs' entitlement to prejudgment interest presents a question of
law whichjve_reviewJ:or_correctness. Vali
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of
Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah
App.1990); Hermes Assocs. v. Park's
Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah
App.1991). Consequently, "we need not accord any particular deference to the decisions below," Vali, 797 P.2d at 444 (citing
Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524,
526-27 (Utah 1988) (agency decision);
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985) (trial court decision)).
Plaintiffs argue that by establishing the
threshold facts of promise, reliance and
damage, they created an entitlement to full
compensation for their expenses, including
interest on the money expended six years
previously. According to plaintiffs, their
right to full compensatory damages includes prejudgment interest as a matter of

law because (1) their damages were sufficiently fixed at the time that they incurred
expenses to repair their home, and (2) prejudgment interest is appropriate because
"the damages claimed were with reference
to the value of the repair of damaged property."
[9-11] The Utah Supreme Court first
discussed the rationale behind prejudgment
interest in Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,
32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1005-06 (1907).
The Fell court stated that because awarding damages at law was intended to return
a plaintiff to the status quo, prejudgment
interest could be available where necessary
to accomplish full compensation. Id. Jn
Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts
and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed
as of a particular time. Bjork v. April
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah
1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct.
2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977). Although
damages may be unliquidated, they must
be calculable through a mathematically certain procedure allowing the court or the
jury to fix the amount by following "fixed
rules of evidence and known standards of
value . . . rather than be[ing] guided by
their best judgment in assessing the
amount" or evaluating elements lacking
fixed standards by which to measure their
value.. Fell, 88 P. at 1007; Price-Orem v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475,
483 (Utah App.1989). Insufficient certainty exists, courts should allow interest from
the time when damages became fixed, rather than from the date of the judgment.
Bjork, 560 P.2d at 317. However, "where
^damages are incomplete and are peculiarly
within the province of the jury to assess at
Ihetime of trial,' " then prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784 P.2d
at 483 (quoting Fell, 88 P. at 1006).
[12] Plaintiffs argue that the amount of
their expenditures to repair the property
damage caused by the fire determined their
damages and that their conscientious and
credible recording of repair expenses created the necessary mathematical certainty.
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We find, however, that while plaintiffs' re- property damage. Furthermore, in concordation of expenses may accurately re- trast to a tort action for property damage,
flect the value of their personal expendi- the recovery properly awarded under a
tures, it does not provide a known standard promissory estoppel theory reflects the exof value for measuring damages in a prom- tent of reliance. To separate the damage
issory estoppel case. Instead, damage as- for which defendant must accept responsisessment based on the Restatement (Sec- bility from expenses which would have ocond) version of promissory estoppel re- curred in the absence of defendant's promquires a factfinder's case by case calcula- ise requires the determination of a facttion of the value of detrimental reliance on finder. Factual evaluation of this type
a promise. Furthermore, "[t]he remedy lacks, mathematical certainty prior to final
granted may be limited as justice re- determination and requires case by case
quires/' Restatement (Second) Contracts analysis. When "the amount of the dam§ 90(1) (1981)/ Damages, therefore, do not age must be ascertained and assessed by
become fixed before a factfinder quantifies the trier of the fact at the trial/' prejudgthe injustice caused by detrimental reli- . ment interest is inappropriate.
Priceance. In assessing this amount, the fact- Orem, 784 P.2d at 482 4 (quoting Bjork,
finder is guided by its best judgment, not a 560 P.2d at 317).
known standard of value.
We, therefore, find that the trial court
We also disagree with plaintiffs' asser- properly refused to allow plaintiffs pretion that prejudgment interest is particular- judgment interest on a jury award based
ly appropriate because their claim refers to on promissory estoppel.
the repair of property damage. Unlike the
case before us, in the cases cited by plainCONCLUSION
tiffs, courts awarding prejudgment interest
In developing promissory estoppel as an
found defendants responsible for actual
damage to the plaintiffs' property under equitable cause of action, Utah has incorpotort theories. See Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. rated flexibility into both the elements of
White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 the substantive doctrine and the measure
(Utah 1976) (finding contractor's negli- of its reliance remedy. A finding that
gence in setting up a natural gas compres- promissory estoppel is applicable requires
sor station responsible for the fire which the factfinder to determine the plaintiff's
completely destroyed it); Fell, 88 P. at recovery by calculating the portion of total
1003-07 (finding that the railroad's delay in expenses reflecting actual, detrimental relishipment caused the death of some of ance. In upholding the promissory estopplaintiffs sheep and the weight loss in pel award determined by the jury, the trial
others). Under circumstances where a de- court did not abuse its discretion. We also
fendant was directly responsible for the find that the trial court correctly denied
property damage, courts have found "no pre-judgment interest on that award.
question about the propriety of allowing
Affirmed.
interest for the destruction of personal
property prior to judgment where value
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
can be measured by facts and figures."
ORME, J., concurs in result only.
Uinta, 546 P.2d at 887 (discussing Fell).
In this case, however, we note that defendant did not directly cause any harm to
plaintiffs' property. The fire caused the
property damage; defendant only impacted
plaintiffs' method of repairing pre-existing
4. The Price-Orem court found that a developer
was not entitled to prejudgment interest against
his surveyor because the amount of damage for
which defendant was responsible was too specu-

lative for prejudgment interest, despite the fact
that the loss was fixed as of a date certain. Id.
at 482-83.

1
2
3

A

No.

It was insufficient to pay all of our bills

within three months after Mark and I purchased the store.
Q

Mr. Van Alstyne, you testified that you did not

4

confer with Mr. Walsh about the sale of the business

5

beginning in the fall of 1985, is that correct?

6

A

Yeah.

7

Q

You did not confer with him then concerning the

8

windingF down of the business and the sale of the assets?

9

A

Oh, I had earlier.

10

Q

Well, that was prior to his selling to Ms. Ericksoi

11
12
13
14

I had earlier.

though, wasn't it?
A

After he had reported to me that he had, that he

was walking out.
Q

But you did testify that you did in fact report

15

to Ms. Erickson the full terms of the sale of the assets of

16

the partnership, is that correct?

17

A

The full terms of the sale of the assets?

18

Q

Yes.

19

A

Like May, '86?

20

Q

'86.

21

A

Right.

22

Q

And did you in fact distribute to her some of the

23

In the spring.

I did.

unsold assets of the partnership?

24

A

Right.

25

Q

Were any of the unsold assets of the partnership

46

I point, she knew we were talking to V.R. Business Brokers.
2

Then they referred me to Helen Hooper, who listed the

3

business.

Then they had a meeting with my attorney and her

4

attorney.

And I believe, I think—and I may be wrong, but

5

I think Mr. Walsh was there.

6

that this store is listed on the market to be sold.

7

we also had an appraisal price.

8
9
10

Q

But my attorney told them
And

That was the extent of your informing Jude

Erickson all along the way?
A

Well, no. Oh, we kept her posted.

I sent her,

11

I think twice, well, maybe more than once, but twice, a

12

letter telling her what is happening.

13
14

Q

Why did you send her a letter and she wasn't an

employee any more?

15

A

16

to sue me.

17

attorney who was coming after me on the grounds alleging

18

that I am preventing her from her rights in this video

19

business, and about—good heavens, just trying to stay

20

alive.

21

Q

Well, again, she kept, you know, they were going
You know, she had--she was working with an

Okay.

Then when you finally sold it the following

22

June of '86, you said that you didn't sell all the assets,

23

that some of the assets you kept and some you gave to

24

Erickson.

25

A

These are assets that Video U.S.A. did not want to
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1

buy.

They could not use them.

2

Q

What were they?

3

A

Well, there was a T.V. and then some Beta movies

4

that were damaged, and a video camera that was broken.

5

i think a cash register and some office supplies.

6

gave to Jude.

And

Those, I

We purchased two video recorders.

7

Q

Who is "we"?

8

A

My wife and I.

So, we made out a check and

9 J purchased the two video recorders.

I took the T.V.,

10

because the video store had purchased out of my own pocket

11

and I paid a carpet cleaning bill earlier that spring.

1

2

And I reimbursed myself for that with some other supplies.

1

^

Q

14
1

1

of sale in June, f 86, with Video U.S.A.

^ I

A

Uh huh (affirmative)

Q

Who received those proceeds?

|

A

Well, Gerald and I.

8 I

U

The reason I'm asking is, I heard Mr. Crawley

17
1

Let's move on to the proceeds from this contract

9 I ask you, said Robinson had gotten all of the proceeds from

20

that; is that true?

21

A

22

split them.

23

since Mark initiated this action against me.

24
25

Q

Well, I'm sorry, no.

I've taken Gerald and I've

I used my proceeds to pay my legal costs

So you split it equally.

how much a month?
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Those payments were

1
2

Q

Which were what?

Were they your personal books?

I mean, which ones?

3

A

Right.

4

Q

Which one is right, this one or the one Mary Ann

5
6

These are different.

prepared?
A

I prepared this just as a general ballpark when

7

I was consulting with you as to what at the very least would}

8

be the outstanding debt that I am in the hole, out these

9

dollar amounts.

At the very least.

I didn't really work

10

into any consideration with respect to interest accrueing

11

there.

I was just trying to get a general idea.

12

MS. MAUGHAN:

Thank you.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CRAWLEY:

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

Anything further?

17

MS. MAUGHAN: No.

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. MAUGHAN: Yes.

20

THE COURT: All right.

That's all.

Any questions?
No questions.
You may step down.

Defense rests?

As I indicated in

21

chambers and at the request of the parties, we will take

22

final argument in the form of simultaneous submitted

23

memorandums.

24

specific input as to the questions I raised, those being

25

mutual mistake of law in relation to the Walsh/Erickson

And I would like, in that regard, your
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'

contract, the question of what in fact could or should have

2

been sold there.
I

4

I would like your road map.

I think it's, as I

' said in chambers, it's fairly clear as to the position of

5

the plaintiff in relation to the relief sought.

I'm not

*

now that clear in relation to the dollars and cents on the

' I claim for relief under the counterclaim, because the
8

evidence has altered it somewhat from the claims as set

9

forth in the pleadings.

But as to the plaintiff's claim

10

that there is a change or alteration in those figures, I

11

would like there to be all the evidence out and in the

12

open to tell me what our bottom line is.

13

Both counsel can see the conflict in the evidence

14

as well as I can.

15

you think I ought to believe and why, and any case

16

citations you have, would you set them forth.

17

J

Please comment on it and tell me what

I would be

glad to look them up, or if you want to set forth pertinent

18

quotes and again, give me four cases on one point as an

19

irrascib le and inflated jurist used to say, just give me

20

your best case.

21

I liked him for.

22

a jurist, but that's all right.

And that's the only thing he

ever did tha

Everything else then, he was not much of

23

Anything further then this afternoon?

24

MR. CRAWLEY:

25

THE COURT:

What date?

You want to pick a date?
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Let's see,

